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Abstract
We consider a standard banking model with agency frictions to simultaneously
study the weakening and reversal of monetary transmission and banks’ risk-
taking in a low-interest environment. Both, weaker monetary transmission
and higher risk-taking arise because lower policy rates impair banks’ net worth.
The pass-through to deposit rates, the level of excess reserves and the extent of
the agency problem between banks and depositors are crucial determinants of
monetary transmission. If the deposit pass-through is sufficiently impaired, a
reversal rate exists. For policy rates below the reversal rate further interest rate
reductions lead to a disproportionate increase in risk-taking and a contraction
in loan supply.
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1 Introduction
For the past decade, central banks in advanced economies have engaged in unprece-
dented monetary easing to stimulate bank lending and boost aggregate demand.
This prolonged period of loose monetary policy raises concerns about its potential
undesirable consequences. First, loose monetary policy may induce banks to increase
risk-taking, which could pose a threat to financial stability (Borio & Zhu, 2012). Sec-
ond, reductions in central bank policy rates could depress bank profits to the point
that banks would respond to further monetary stimulus by raising, rather than low-
ering, loan rates, thus choking off the credit supply to the economy (Brunnermeier
& Koby, 2017).
In the present paper, we propose a stylized model that allows to study the risk-
taking and the impaired bank lending channels simultaneously. Our model generates
predictions that are in line with the empirical findings with regard to the effects of
monetary policy in low interest environments. In particular, we show that higher
risk-taking incentives and the impairment of the bank lending channel can be viewed
as two sides of the same coin: both arise in response to an adverse effect of lower
policy rates on banks’ profitability.
The extant literature has studied the risk-taking channel and the impairment
of the bank lending channel in separate theoretical frameworks. Models of the risk-
taking channel (e.g., Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014); Martinez-Miera & Repullo (2017)) can
offer explanations for the empirically observed negative relationship between bank
risk-taking and policy rates (Maddaloni & Peydró, 2011; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2017).
However, these models abstract from the characteristics of the current low interest en-
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vironment. Therefore, they cannot explain empirical observations that occur specif-
ically at low levels of policy rate, e.g., a positive relationship between bank profits
and policy rates (Ampudia & Van den Heuvel, 2019; Wang et al., 2020), or a negative
relationship between mortgage rates and policy rates (Basten & Mariathasan, 2020;
Miller & Wanengkirtyo, 2020). These empirical relations are implied by models that
study the impaired bank lending channel and emphasize the importance of the lower
bound on deposit rates and banks’ excess liquidity holdings (e.g., Brunnermeier &
Koby (2017); Eggertsson et al. (2019); Ulate (2021)). However, these models ab-
stract from banks’ risk and therefore can explain neither why banks may increase
their risk-taking when policy rates become negative (Basten & Mariathasan, 2020;
Heider et al., 2019; Bittner et al., 2021), nor why a weaker pass-through to loan rates
can be observed specifically for riskier banks (Arce et al., 2021).
We consider a model of financial intermediation in which a banker uses deposits
and own equity to fund the issuance of risky loans and holdings of safe reserves. The
banker can exert monitoring effort to reduce the default risk of her loan portfolio.
While depositors can observe the banker’s choice of loan issuance and reserve hold-
ings, her monitoring effort is unobservable, inducing an agency problem between the
banker and her depositors.
We make two assumptions that reflect key characteristics of low interest rate en-
vironments. First, there is a lower bound on deposit rates; i.e., there exists a minimal
return that the bank must offer on deposits for agents to be willing to hold them
rather than switch to cash. This assumption reflects the empirical observation that
deposit rates tend to approach a lower bound as changes in deposit rates become
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progressively smaller when policy rates are lowered into negative territory (Eggerts-
son et al., 2019). Second, the banker holds excess reserves. That is, we assume that
even when policy rates become rather low, the banker never uses up her entire fund-
ing base to fund loan issuance and always retains some holdings of liquid reserves
with the central bank. This assumption reflects the fact that since the financial cri-
sis of 2008/09, reductions in short-term policy rates have been accompanied by an
increase in large-scale asset purchase and lending programs by central banks. These
measures have increased banks’ reserve holdings in excess of regulatory provisions
(such as minimum reserves and liquidity requirements).
In our model, monetary transmission, i.e., the effect of the risk-free rate on loan
rates and volumes, works via two channels: A portfolio adjustment channel and,
a risk channel. The portfolio adjustment channel reflects the conventional view of
monetary transmission whereby lower risk-free rates are expansionary and translate
into more bank lending. A lower risk-free rate reduces the return on risk-free reserves
and thereby the opportunity cost of loan issuance. The banker optimally balances
the lower cost of lending by decreasing the loan rate and increasing the loan supply.
The risk channel arises because the agency problem between the banker and her
depositors implies that the banker’s monitoring incentives are directly affected by
changes in the risk-free rate. First, a lower risk-free rate reduces the profitability of
reserves and thus lowers total profits. This reserve earnings effect worsens monitoring
incentives. Second, when the banker can pass a lower risk-free rate on to depositors,
profits increase. This deposit pass-through effect improves monitoring incentives.
When the first effect dominates the second effect, the banker’s monitoring incentives
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decline when the risk-free rate falls. This negative effect of lower risk-free rates on
monitoring incentives can arise in our model because of the lower bound on deposit
rates. As a consequence, when the reserve earnings effect dominates the deposit pass-
through effect, further reductions in the risk-free rate worsen monitoring incentives,
and the banker optimally increases her risk-taking.
To balance the adverse effect of a higher risk level on profits, the banker has an
incentive to optimally increase the loan rate and reduce the loan volume. We show
that the risk channel counteracts the portfolio adjustment channel and that the effect
of lower policy rates on the banker’s loan issuance becomes weaker if the risk-free
rate falls below a critical value.
Furthermore, we show that the risk channel can also dominate the portfolio ad-
justment channel. In particular, we show the existence of a critical value below which
further reductions in the risk-free rate induce banks to cut back on lending. The crit-
ical value constitutes a reversal rate, as in Brunnermeier & Koby (2017). Like their
model, a precondition for the reversal rate in our model is that bank profits decline
when the risk-free rate falls. In contrast to Brunnermeier & Koby (2017), however,
the reversal rate in our model does not arise due to an exogenous constraint on future
bank profits but due to the agency friction between the banker and her depositors.
We extend our model to consider the effects of insured deposits and perfect com-
petition on the possibility of transmission reversal. Deposit insurance (not fairly
priced in equilibrium) provides an (exogenous) subsidy to the bank that increases
its profits at any risk-free rate. As a consequence, deposit insurance mitigates the
problem of transmission reversal. At the limit, when all deposits are insured, the
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reversal rate ceases to exist. Thus, ceteris paribus, transmission reversal is less of a
problem for banks that are funded with a larger share of insured deposits. Perfect
competition, in contrast, can amplify the problem of transmission reversal. Com-
pared to the case with loan market power, the condition for a reversal is weaker under
perfect competition. This is because competition erodes profits such that banks may
be forced to reduce loan issuance at a higher level of the risk-free rate.
In our baseline model, we make a strict assumption to ensure that the bank holds
a strictly positive reserve balance. We justify this assumption by making reference
to the current environment of high excess liquidity in the banking sector which is
primarily driven by central banks’ asset purchase programs. In an extension, we
show that our main results remain largely unchanged if we allow the bank to borrow
from the central bank, i.e., hold negative reserve balances, but deposits are subject
to random in- and outflows.
Related Literature. Our paper relates to a large body of literature that analyzes
the transmission of monetary policy via the banking sector. The traditional view
of the bank lending channel holds that a reduction in policy rates reduces banks’
funding cost and induces greater loan supply (Bernanke & Blinder, 1988; Bernanke
& Gertler, 1995; Kashyap & Stein, 1994). While this channel is also at work in our
model, we show that it can be weakened or amplified by a risk channel that arises
due to agency frictions between the bank and its depositors.
This relates our paper to the literature on the bank risk-taking channel, which
argues that low policy rates may lead banks to increase the riskiness of their loan port-
folio (Gambacorta, 2009; Rajan, 2010; Borio & Zhu, 2012). In particular, our model
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builds on Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014, 2017), who emphasize the role of agency frictions
between banks and their creditors as a key determinant of the risk-taking channel.
The bank in our paper faces a similar agency problem as banks in Dell’Ariccia et al.
(2014) or Cordella et al. (2018). Furthermore, Martinez-Miera & Repullo (2020)
show that the loan market structure is key for the relationship between interest rates
and risk-taking decisions of financial intermediaries because it shapes the extent to
which lower funding costs are passed through to loan rates. The ability of banks to
pass lower risk-free rates through to deposit and loan rates is also a driver in our
model. However, the former models assume that the pass-through of monetary pol-
icy to deposit rates is frictionless. In contrast to these papers, we focus on monetary
transmission in a low interest rate environment and take into account the effects of
reserve holdings and an imperfect pass-through to deposit rates.
This connects our paper to the growing literature on monetary policy transmis-
sion in a low interest rate environment. Eggertsson et al. (2019) argue that due
to the increasing attractiveness of cash, the pass-through to deposit rates becomes
impaired when the policy rate approaches the zero lower bound or becomes negative.
Brunnermeier & Koby (2017) show the existence of an effective lower bound – the
so-called reversal rate – below which further reductions in policy rates lead to an in-
crease in loan rates. Both, Brunnermeier & Koby (2017) and Eggertsson et al. (2019)
derive their theoretical results by imposing an exogenous net worth constraint that,
once binding, mechanically increases the equilibrium loan rate. Repullo (2020) points
out that such an exogenous constraint on the future value of the bank’s capital does
not reflect standard banking regulation. Repullo (2020) further demonstrates that
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the reversal rate fails to arise in a model with a standard capital requirement. Our
paper complements this literature by tying the net worth constraint to a standard
agency problem between the banker and her creditors. In this respect, our paper is
also related to Pariès et al. (2020), who study the reversal rate in a macroeconomic
general equilibrium model and consider the bank’s net worth constraint as an agency
problem. However, the net worth constraint in Pariès et al. (2020) arises because
the banker can abscond with the deposits rather than because of unobservable mon-
itoring and risk-taking, as in our model. Thus, while they also conclude that larger
bank equity mitigates the reversal problem, they abstract entirely from risk-taking.
2 Model setup
We consider a bank over two periods, indexed by t = 0, 1. The bank is run by a risk-
neutral bank owner/manager (“banker”) who is endowed with own funds and receives
deposits from a large number of risk-neutral depositors. The banker decides on the
issuance of loans and on the monitoring of her loan portfolio. Monitoring entails a
private cost for the banker and reduces the riskiness of her loan portfolio. Depositors
cannot observe the banker’s monitoring choice, and the banker cannot commit to a
certain level of monitoring. The main focus of our analysis is on the transmission
of monetary policy to loan rates, the loan volume and the banker’s monitoring/risk
taking. We take the gross risk-free interest rate r > 0 as the measure of monetary
policy, and we assume that it can be perfectly controlled by the central bank.
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Bank liabilities. The banker is endowed with own funds E ≥ 0. In addition,
she can attract deposits in period 0 from a large number of depositors. Deposits
are uninsured and depositors need to be compensated for the risk that the banker
becomes unable to fully repay the depositors in period 1.1 Thus, to attract deposits,
the banker must offer a deposit rate, rD, that, in expected terms, matches depositors’
outside option, u(r).
Assumption 1. The depositors’ outside option u(r) ≥ r is bounded below by u. For
r > u−1(u), u(r) is strictly increasing (u′(r) > 0) and weakly convex (u′′(r) ≥ 0).
The lower bound u reflects the idea that depositors would switch to other assets,
such as non-interest bearing cash holdings, once the risk-free rate becomes too low.
The lower bound is not necessarily equal to zero, as negative rates could still be
compensated for in the form of non-pecuniary benefits of deposits, such as the safety
and ease of making payments.2 The further assumption that the outside option
weakly increases at an increasing rate reflects the idea that the relative benefit of
holding deposits decreases in an environment of higher real interest rates when the
profitability of other assets increases.
To simplify the exposition in the main part of this paper, we assume that the
banker cannot adjust the ‘intensive margin’ of her deposits. That is, she either raises
an amount D or no deposits at all. Our preferred interpretation of this assumption
is that deposits are subject to in- and outflows that cannot be easily scaled by the
1Section 4.1 considers the effect when the banker also issues insured deposits.
2For example, suppose that depositors, instead of holding deposits, could either hold a risk-free
bond at rate r or cash which provides a per-unit convenience yield θ and requires a per-unit storage
cost x. For this case, u(r) = max{1 + θ − x, r}.
9
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3925073
banker because they are determined by the decisions of depositors. For example,
depositors can be firms that hold their working capital with the bank and need
to make payments. Alternatively, deposits can be created when the central bank
purchases bonds and other fixed-income assets from depositors under quantitative
easing programs. When buying such assets from non-bank entities, the central bank
transfers the purchase price to their deposit accounts, while the respective banks
receive a transfer of central bank liquidity into their reserve accounts. The banker
cannot easily scale such flows up or down since they are determined by the depositors’
decisions to sell (buy) securities.3
Bank assets and monitoring. The banker is a monopolist in the local loan
market. Loan demand in period 0 is described by a demand curve L(rL), with
L′(rL) < 0 and L
′′(rL) ≤ 0, where rL denotes the gross interest rate that the bank
charges on loans.4 Loans are risky and are repaid in period 1 with probability
q ∈ (0, 1). The banker can exert unobservable monitoring effort to influence the
repayment probability of her loan portfolio. We assume that monitoring is translated
one-to-one into the success probability so that the banker can directly choose q.




q2, where κ > 0.
3The current level of excess reserves by the banking sector is primarily driven by the quantitative
easing (QE) programs of central banks. For example, since 2015, the euro area banking sector
increased reserve holdings by more than EUR 1.3 trillion (Bechtel et al., 2021).
4As a technical condition to ensure the uniqueness of the equilibrium, we assume that L(·) is
not too concave, i.e., |L′′(rL)| is bounded above.
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Alternatively, the banker can invest in a risk-free asset that yields the gross risk-
free return r in period 1. For example, this can be current accounts held with the
central bank or investments in high-quality government bonds. The amount invested
in the risk-free asset is denoted by R and henceforth referred to as reserves.
The bank’s funding constraint in period 0 is given by
R + L = D + E. (1)
The level of reserves is endogenously determined through the loan choice of the




to denote the share of deposits held in risk-free reserves and we refer to it as the
reserves-deposit-ratio.
To simplify the exposition of the main part of the analysis, we focus on the case
in which the banker always holds a positive reserve balance.





η(L−1(D + E)) < 1.
Assumption 2 implies that the banker never exhausts her entire funding base to
issue loans but always holds a strictly positive amount of excess reserves. The case
of large (excess) reserves is currently the empirically relevant case and likely remains
so for the foreseeable future. During the 2008/09 financial crisis, major central
banks, such as the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England, deviated
significantly from their previous regimes of neutral liquidity conditions and have not
11
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3925073
since returned to their pre-crisis modes of liquidity management. In particular, the
increase in large-scale asset purchases since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has
further ratcheted up banks’ holdings of reserves in excess of regulatory requirements.
We relax Assumption 2 in Section 4.3, where we introduce random liquidity shocks
to deposits but we allow the bank to choose the deposit volume endogenously and
allow the bank to borrow from the central bank, i.e., R < 0.
Sequence of events and equilibrium. Figure 1 shows the sequence of events
in the model. An equilibrium of the model is given by a loan rate r∗L and a de-
posit rate r∗D, which jointly determine the bank’s optimal loan supply, L
∗, optimal
reserves, R∗, and the monitoring choice, q∗. The loan rate r∗L and the monitoring
choice q∗ maximize the banker’s expected profits given the funding constraint (1),
while the deposit rate r∗D ensures depositor participation, given depositors’ rational
expectations about the bank’s monitoring choice.
t = 0
• Monetary authority determines risk-
free rate r.
• Loan rate rL and deposit rate rD
are determined.
• Bank receives deposits D and in-
vests deposits and equity E into loans
L and reserves R.
• Banker decides on monitoring.
t = 1
• Loans mature.
• Depositors receive rD if loans pay
out (with probability q), else they
receive remaining reserves.
Figure 1: Sequence of Events
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3 Monetary transmission with the portfolio ad-
justment and risk channels
Optimal monitoring choice. We solve the model backwards by first considering
the banker’s optimal choice of monitoring and then determining her optimal loan
issuance and reserve holdings. The banker’s expected profits, given rL and R, can
be written as




The first-order condition for the optimal monitoring choice becomes5
rLL(rL) + rR− rDD − κq̂ = 0. (3)
Given that depositors rationally anticipate the bank’s optimal monitoring choice
q̂, the interest rate on deposits that ensures depositor participation must satisfy




Depositors expect to be paid rD with probability q̂. With converse probability,
the bank defaults when loans do not pay out at maturity and depositors obtain a
senior claim over a pro-rata share of the remaining assets (reserves plus accrued
interest). The expected repayment to depositors must be at least as large as their
outside option, u(r). Since the bank’s expected profits are strictly decreasing in rD,
5All derivations can be found in the Appendix.
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condition (4) binds at the optimum, so we can substitute
rD =




into condition (3) and solve for the optimal monitoring choice q̂.6














≥ 0 if u′(r) ≤ ρ
< 0 else
where η(rL) ≡ −L′(rL)rL/L(rL) denotes the loan demand elasticity and ρ ≡ R/D.
The effects of rL and r on the optimal monitoring level reflect the effects of these
rates on the banker’s expected profits. Whenever a marginal increase in these rates
raises profits, the banker increases her monitoring and vice versa.
More specifically, a higher loan rate increases monitoring whenever the Lerner
index, (q̂rL − r)/q̂r, is lower than the inverse loan demand elasticity, 1/η(rL), which
is the standard condition for the profits of a monopolistic bank to increase in rL
(Freixas & Rochet, 1997).
Whether a lower risk-free rate increases profits and therefore leads to higher
monitoring depends on the relative magnitude of two effects. On the one hand, a
marginal reduction in the risk-free rate lowers the value of the depositors’ outside
6Since the equation that pins down q̂ is quadratic, there are two solutions. Following Allen et al.
(2011), we choose the larger of the two roots. Moreover, as Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014), we focus on
the interior solution where q̂ < 1 and abstract from the corner solution where q̂ = 1. There is a
sufficiently large range of values for κ such that the interior solution exists.
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option and thereby reduces the banker’s expected deposit funding costs. This deposit
pass-through effect increases profits by an amount u′(r)D and incentivizes the banker
to increase monitoring. On the other hand, a marginal reduction in the risk-free rate
reduces the banker’s return on safe reserves. This reserve earnings effect reduces
profits marginally by R and induces the banker to reduce monitoring. Thus, a
marginally lower risk-free rate decreases monitoring if the deposit pass-through effect
is smaller than the reserve earnings effect, i.e., if
u′(r)D < R ⇔ u′(r) < ρ. (6)
Optimal loan issuance and reserve holdings. Substituting the funding con-
straint (1), the deposit rate (5) and the banker’s optimal monitoring choice q̂(rL, r)
into Equation (2) allows us to rewrite expected profits as
Π = q̂(rL, r)rLL(rL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected earnings on loans.
+ r(D + E − L(rL))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Earnings on reserves








The banker’s remaining choice variable is the loan rate rL. The optimal loan
rate, r∗L, is determined by the standard condition for loan issuance of a monopolistic











At the optimum point, the loan demand elasticity exceeds unity, η(r∗L) > 1. Con-
dition (8) follows from the fact that the effect of rL on q̂ can also be expressed in
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terms of the Lerner index and the inverse demand elasticity (cf. Lemma 1).
Monetary policy transmission. Monetary policy affects the banker’s optimal
loan rate (and therefore the loan volume) through a portfolio adjustment channel




















The conventional view of monetary policy transmission holds that monetary pol-
icy actions that lower the risk-free rate are expansionary, as they lead to greater bank
loan issuance. The portfolio adjustment channel reflects this conventional monetary
policy transmission. Effectively, the banker solves an optimal portfolio problem by
allocating her funding resources between two investment opportunities (loans and re-
serves).7 Given q̂, a lower risk-free rate reduces the opportunity cost of investing in
loans rather than holding reserves. As a consequence, the banker optimally reduces
the loan rate and increases her loan issuance.
In contrast to the portfolio adjustment channel, the direction of the risk channel
is ambiguous and it can either amplify or dampen the portfolio adjustment effect.
Ceteris paribus, a lower success probability increases the loan rate, thereby reducing
the amount of loan issuance, i.e., ∂r∗L/∂q < 0. Thus, whenever the reserve earnings
7Since the volume of deposits is fixed, the optimal loan rate is independent of the costs of deposits
as in the textbook version of a monopolistic bank with separable loan and deposit choices (Freixas
& Rochet, 1997). In Section 4.3, we show a variant of the model where the bank can choose its
deposit volume.
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effect dominates the deposit pass-through effect, a reduction in the risk-free rate low-
ers monitoring, ∂q̂/∂r > 0, and the risk channel counteracts the portfolio adjustment
channel, thereby weakening monetary transmission.
Proposition 1. For a sufficiently small risk-free rate, the reserve earnings effect
dominates the deposit pass-through effect and the risk channel weakens the transmis-
sion of monetary policy via the portfolio adjustment channel, i.e., there exists r such
that
r < r ⇒ ∂q̂
∂r
> 0. (10)
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 1, note that the lower bound on
u(r) implies that for r < u−1(u), the deposit pass-through becomes fully impaired,
i.e., u′(r) = 0, and the banker is unable to pass a lower risk-free rate through to
her depositors, thereby becoming unable to further reduce her expected funding
cost. Moreover, by Assumption 2, the banker always holds a strictly positive level of
reserves. Thus, the reserve earnings effect must dominate the deposit pass-through
effect already at a level of the risk-free rate r > u−1(u). Below the critical value r, a
lower risk-free rate reduces the banker’s monitoring incentives, and the risk channel
weakens the portfolio adjustment channel.8
Reversal of monetary transmission. The risk channel may not only weaken
the portfolio adjustment channel but also dominate it, implying that a lower risk-
8Observe that condition (10) is only a sufficient condition. It does not rule out the possibility
that the reserve earnings effect becomes dominant over the deposit pass-through effect at a higher
level of the risk-free rate (above r̄). Whether such a case can arise depends crucially on further
properties of u(r) and L(rL), such as the curvature or magnitude of its rate of change.
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free rate will lead to an increase in the loan rate and a reduction in the bank’s loan
supply.
Proposition 2. The risk channel dominates the portfolio adjustment channel, i.e.,
dr∗L
dr






To understand the intuition behind Proposition 2, recall that, on the one hand,
a lower success probability makes loan issuance relatively less profitable compared
to holding reserves, implying that the bank cuts back its loan issuance when q falls.
On the other hand, a lower risk-free rate reduces the return on reserves and makes
holding reserves less profitable. If the reduction in the risk-free rate lowers the success
probability and therefore the profitability of loans by more than the profitability
of reserves, the bank prefers to hold more reserves, despite a lower risk-free rate.
However, for the profitability of loans to fall by more than the profitability of reserves,
the banker’s monitoring must react strongly enough, i.e., a reduction in r must lead
to a disproportional reduction in q̂.
Proposition 3. If the monitoring costs are sufficiently large, then the risk channel
dominates the portfolio adjustment channel if the risk-free rate becomes sufficiently
low: i.e., for κ > κ, there exists a critical value r̂ < r̄ such that





The critical value r̂ is strictly increasing in the bank’s monitoring cost, κ, and strictly
decreasing in the banker’s own equity, E.
18
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3925073
Proposition 3 translates the condition in Proposition 2 into a critical value for
the risk-free rate. In particular, whenever monitoring costs are sufficiently high
and the risk-free rate falls below the critical rate, then the elasticity of q̂ becomes
sufficiently large so that the risk channel becomes the dominant transmission channel
of monetary policy. As in Brunnermeier & Koby (2017), below r̂, reductions in
the risk-free rate are contractionary, rather than expansionary, and r̂ constitutes a
reversal rate.
However, in contrast to Brunnermeier & Koby (2017), the reversal rate in our
model is a consequence of banks’ risk-taking behavior. At a sufficiently low level of
the risk-free rate, further reductions in the policy rate cannot be fully passed through
to depositors. Thus, given large reserve holdings, lower policy rates depress banks’
expected profits, thereby increasing their risk-taking incentives and leading them to
raise loan rates.
Implications of the model. We use Propositions 1 and 3 to derive implications
of the effects of monetary policy in a high excess liquidity and low interest rates
environment.
Hypothesis 1. For given equity E, higher (excess) reserves are associated with
1. higher bank risk-taking;
2. higher loan rates and a lower loan volume;
3. weaker monetary policy transmission.
19
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Hypothesis 1 follows because larger reserves strengthen the reserve earnings ef-
fect compared to the deposit pass-through effect. As a consequence, the threshold
r̄ increases, and the range of policy rates at which the risk channel weakens the
transmission via the portfolio channel becomes larger. Hypothesis 1 is in line with
recent empirical findings by Miller & Wanengkirtyo (2020), who study monetary
transmission in an environment characterized by excess liquidity. In particular, they
show that, following a reduction in the policy rate, banks with larger excess reserves
extend lending to riskier borrowers. Moreover, they also find that the transmission
of policy rates to loan rates becomes substantially weaker in an environment of ex-
cess liquidity, i.e., comparing transmission before and after the financial crisis, they
show that the presence of excess liquidity reduces the transmission into loan rates
by about 28 bps.9
Hypothesis 2. The reversal rate is larger if, ceteris paribus:
1. the bank is endowed with a smaller level of equity;
2. the bank is riskier and its loan portfolio is more costly to monitor.
Hypothesis 2 follows from the effects of equity, E, and the monitoring cost pa-
rameter, κ, on the reversal rate r̂ (cf. Proposition 3). Brunnermeier & Koby (2017)
also show that the reversal rate increases with bank equity, but the underlying mech-
anism in our model is different. In our model, a smaller equity endowment (as well
as a larger cost parameter κ) strengthens the bank’s agency problem and increases
9Similarly, Jimenez et al. (2012) show that banks with more liquidity on their balance sheet
expand loan issuance less following a rate cut. However, their data do not allow us to disentangle
excess and required reserves.
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its risk-taking incentives. Since higher risk-taking raises the loan rate for any value
of r, the reversal rate at which the risk channel dominates the portfolio channel also
increases.
Hypothesis 2 is in line with recent evidence by Arce et al. (2021), who show that
a negative correlation between policy and loan rates can be found for banks that are
weakly capitalized and whose lending is riskier. Similarly, Basten & Mariathasan
(2020) and Miller & Wanengkirtyo (2020) find that lower policy rates are negatively
correlated with mortgage rates, but not with interest rates on other types of loans.
To the extent that mortgage handling is relatively more costly than the origination




In this section, we consider how deposit insurance alters the transmission of monetary
policy via portfolio adjustment and risk channels and the possibility of a transmission
reversal. Suppose that a share δ ∈ [0, 1] of deposits are insured at a zero flat rate.
Insured depositors have the same outside option as uninsured depositors, u(r).
As before, we solve the model backwards, by first deriving the banker’s optimal
monitoring choice and thereafter the optimal loan rate. The first-order condition for
the monitoring choice is as in Equation (3), except that we replace the deposit rate
rD by the average deposit rate, r̄D, which depends on the share of insured deposits.
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As uninsured depositors rationally anticipate bank monitoring q̂, the average deposit
rate is 10
r̄D =




Substituting r̄D into Equation (3) implicitly defines the banker’s optimal mon-
itoring q̂(rL, r, δ). Importantly, the condition for q̂ to increase in r is the same as
before in Lemma 1
∂q̂(rL, r, δ)
∂r
> 0 ⇔ u′(r) < ρ.
An increase in δ increases monitoring: ∂q̂
∂δ
> 0. This ‘charter value effect’ of
deposit insurance is described in Cordella et al. (2018):11 As the deposit rate is
given when the banker chooses her monitoring, a higher share of insured deposits
amounts to a greater implicit subsidy from the deposit insurance, thereby reducing
the repayments to depositors and increasing the banker’s profits. As a consequence,
higher deposit insurance coverage strengthens monitoring incentives.
The banker’s expected profit takes the same form as before in Equation (7) except
that now the implicit subsidy from funding with a share δ of insured deposits is added.
We can use the average deposit rate and the banker’s optimal monitoring choice to
write expected profits as




+ S(δ, rL, r, R)
10For simplicity, we assume that, after default at maturity, the bank’s cash flows from reserves
are split on a pro-rata basis among all depositors, insured and uninsured.
11Cordella et al. (2018, Proposition 1) show that the effect arises if the share of deposit liabilities
that are priced ‘at the margin’ is sufficiently small. In our model, this share is zero since depositors
never observe the banker’s actual risk-taking.
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where S(δ, rL, r, R) ≡ (1− q̂(rL, r, δ))δ(u(r)D− rR) is the implicit subsidy from the
deposit insurance.
Ceteris paribus, larger reserves reduce the implicit subsidy. This is because de-
posit insurance can use safe reserves to cover (part of) its liabilities in case the loans
fail.
The transmission of monetary policy works as before via the portfolio adjustment
and risk channels. Since optimal monitoring increases in the risk-free rate whenever
the reserve earnings effect dominates the deposit pass-through effect, the condition
for the risk channel to weaken monetary transmission remains formally the same as
in the benchmark model with δ = 0.
However, the presence of insured deposits changes the relative importance of the
portfolio adjustment and risk channels in the transmission of monetary policy.
Proposition 4. Given a share δ of insured deposits, the risk channel dominates the
portfolio adjustment channel, i.e.,
dr∗L
dr









Comparing Propositions 2 and 4 shows that the condition for the dominance of
the risk channel is stronger when the banker is funded with insured deposits. The
reason is that the banker obtains a larger implicit subsidy from deposit insurance
when she holds fewer reserves. This asset substitution motive provides an additional
incentive for the banker to increase her loan issuance when the risk-free rate falls.
Thus, deposit insurance strengthens the portfolio channel and alleviates the problem
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of transmission reversal. Simply put, the deposit insurance subsidy mitigates the
adverse effect of lower rates on the bank’s profitability by increasing its profits.
Hypothesis 3. The reversal rate r̂ is smaller for banks that are funded with a larger
share of insured deposits. In the limit, for δ → 1, the reversal rate ceases to exist.
4.2 Monetary transmission and competition
We now consider the effect of perfect competition on the weakening and reversal of
monetary transmission. We focus again on the baseline case in which deposits are
not insured. Following Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014), we assume that the loan rate is set
competitively so that the bank makes zero profits in equilibrium.
When solving, given a loan market equilibrium, the monitoring effort is implicitly
defined by the same condition as before, which we obtain by combining Equations (3)
and (4)
q̂rLL+ r R− u(r)D − κ q̂2 = 0. (12)
We then impose a zero profit condition on the bank’s loan choice:





The zero profit condition implicitly defines the equilibrium loan rate r∗L as a function
of the risk-free rate r. Equations (12) and (13) simultaneously define the perfectly
competitive banking sector equilibrium.12
12The representative banker’s risk choice is similar to her risk choice under loan market power
(cf. Lemma 1), except that the banker’s loan choice L is independent of rL.
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Substituting Equation (12) into (13) we obtain the equilibrium condition that
pins down the equilibrium loan rate




The competitive loan rate is implicitly defined by the equality of monitoring effort
cost and the (opportunity) cost of equity.
Proposition 5. Under perfect competition, the risk channel dominates the portfolio
adjustment channel, i.e, drL
dr









The condition on the risk elasticity for a transmission reversal is weaker than that
for the monopoly case (cf. Equation (11)). The reason is that the monopoly bank
makes a positive profit that is eroded by competition. However, the reversal rate
itself can be larger or smaller under perfect competition compared to the monopoly
case because risk elasticity is not the same under the two market structures. If risk
elasticity is the same for the monopolistic and the competitive banks, then, ceteris
paribus, the reversal rate would be unambiguously higher under perfect competition.
4.3 Liquidity shocks and endogenous deposits
In the benchmark model, Assumption 2 and the fact that the banker cannot adjust
the volume of deposits implies a positive level of reserve holdings. Suppose, however,
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that the bank could choose the deposit volume D. In the absence of a specific reason
for holding reserves, the bank would entirely abstain from holding reserves as long as
the risk free rate earned on reserves was lower than the opportunity cost of deposits.
Thus, the risk channel would never counteract the portfolio adjustment channel since
u′(r) ≥ 0 and a reversal of monetary policy could not occur.
Previously, we motivated the assumption of fixed deposit volume and positive
reserve holdings by arguing that banks cannot easily adjust in- and outflows to
their deposit accounts. In line with this motivation, we now explicitly consider
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks to depositors, i.e., in- and outflows to and from their
deposit accounts. For example, inflows to deposit accounts can be interpreted as
sales of assets from the depositor to the central bank which automatically add to
the bank’s reserves holdings. Outflows from deposit accounts, in turn, need to be
covered by running down reserves or by additional borrowing from the central bank.
For simplicity, we assume that the bank can access the central bank’s standing deposit
and lending facilities at an interest rate r to deposit excess reserves or cover deposit
outflows.13 Moreover, we assume that the bank can also borrow ex ante from the
central bank up to a fraction σ ∈ (0, 1) of its loan issuance, i.e., we impose R ≥ −σL∗.
Liquidity shocks, denoted x, are drawn from a continuous distribution with
c.d.f. F (·) and p.d.f. f(·) over support [−1, z], where z denotes the maximal inflows
to an individual deposit account. We assume that the liquidity shocks realize after
the bank has contracted the deposit rate, set its loan rate and chosen the optimal
monitoring effort. To simplify the exposition, we set E[x] = 0 and E = 0.
13Allowing for an interest rate corridor by making the borrowing rate higher than the deposit
rate would complicate this analysis without altering the main results.
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As before, we solve the model backwards. Given rD, the bank’s optimal moni-
toring is still determined by Equation (3). The random in- and outflows to deposit
accounts affect the deposit cost of the bank. In particular, if the bank is solvent,
depositors receive rD on their entire deposit holdings at maturity. With probability
1 − q, the bank defaults. In this case, depositors obtain a pro-rata share of the
remaining (positive) holdings of reserves. The expected repayment to deposits must








By substituting rD into Equation (3), we can solve the bank’s monitoring choice
q̂(rL, D; r). The partial effects of rL, r and D on the banker’s optimal monitoring
q̂ reflect the effects of these variables on her expected profits. As before, the effects
of rL and r are ambiguous, with the respective conditions now taking into account
expected deposit flows.14 However, the effect of D on q̂ is unambiguously negative,
i.e., ∂q̂
∂D
< 0. This is because u(r) ≥ r so deposits are relatively more expensive than
borrowing from the central bank (cf. Assumption 1).
Lemma 2. The bank chooses a strictly positive loan issuance L∗(r). Given As-
sumption 1, the bank minimizes its funding cost by choosing R∗ = −σL∗ and D∗ =
(1− σ)L∗.
Lemma 2 shows that the bank borrows from the central bank on a permanent
basis as long as this is feasible (i.e., if σ > 0). Even though the bank does not hold
14See the Appendix for details.
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a positive level of reserves ex ante, the possibility that it ends up with a positive
reserve balance due to random deposit inflows implies that the risk channel can still
mitigate and even dominate the portfolio channel.
Proposition 6. The risk channel dominates the portfolio adjustment channel, i.e.,
drL
dr











Modulo the probability of deposit outflows, the condition for the risk channel to
dominate the portfolio adjustment channel is essentially the same as condition (11)
when deposits are deterministic and exogenously given.15 Condition (17) allows us
to illustrate the effect of permanent central bank lending programs on the existence
of the reversal rate. Consider the extreme case in which the bank could finance
its entire loan portfolio by borrowing from the central bank, i.e., lim σ → 1. In this
case, a reversal rate would cease to exist and the risk channel would never counteract
the portfolio adjustment channel.16 Such a situation is similar to the case with full
deposit insurance, δ = 1. The entire risk of the bank’s loan issuance and the bank’s
exposure to interest rate risk would be borne by the central bank and lower policy
rates would unambiguously increase the bank’s profit.
15If the bank would only receive deposit inflows, then Prob[x < σ1−σ ] = 0 and condition (17)
would equal condition (11).
16The right-hand side of Equation (17) converges to ∞, while the left-hand side would assume a
finite value, implying that the condition could never be satisfied.
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5 Conclusion
The current environment of low and sometimes negative policy rates has given rise
to concerns about the implications of low rates for the riskiness of bank portfolios
and about whether low rates may impair the transmission of monetary policy. The
present paper argues that these (unintended) consequences of low interest rates are
two sides of the same coin as they are both caused by agency frictions between a
bank and its short-term creditors.
As our model is a partial equilibrium model, it does not provide quantitative
guidance about the level of the critical rate at which banks become constrained
and monetary transmission weakens. However, as emphasized by Repullo (2020),
partial equilibrium models can provide insights into the basic economic mechanisms
and conditions that may trigger specific consequences of monetary policy, thereby
providing input for larger quantitative models. In this respect, the contribution of
our paper is twofold. First, we emphasize that lower policy rates that shrink bank
profit margins lead banks to increase risk-taking, which in turn causes a weakening
of the transmission of monetary policy to loan rates and volumes.
Second, our model admits the possibility that in an environment of sufficiently
low policy rates, reductions in the policy rate can decrease banks’ loan issuance.
The existence of such a reversal rate depends on banks’ characteristics (insured
deposits, monitoring technology and the banks’ capitalization) and the environment
in which they operate. However, the reversal of monetary transmission is only an
extreme manifestation of the more general phenomenon of weakened transmission
due to higher risk-taking incentives in a low interest environment. This phenomenon
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should be of concern to central banks and may require them to devise policies that
address the underlying causes of weaker transmission such as low capitalization, large
excess liquidity or impaired deposit pass-through.
Our model suggests two policy implications that could help to alleviate the prob-
lem of weaker transmission in a low-interest rate environment. First, to counteract
adverse effects on bank profitability that arise from a combination of excess liquid-
ity and negative rates, central banks could implement reserve remuneration schemes
that bolster bank profits. While such schemes redistribute seigniorage revenues back
to banks, they could nevertheless strengthen the transmission and render monetary
policy more effective. In this respect, our model provides a rationale for the recently
introduced two-tiered remuneration for excess reserves by the Eurosystem that seeks
to mitigate the effect of negative interest rates on bank profitability.17 Second, our
model suggests that the current environment of high excess liquidity and impaired
deposit pass-through is conducive to the empirically observed positive relationship
between bank capital and policy rates. As higher bank capital (a smaller leverage)
mitigates the agency problem and lowers the reversal rate, our model echoes a re-
cent literature (Gambacorta & Shin, 2018; Pariès et al., 2020) that argues that the
capitalization of banks may matter not only for the central bank’s financial stability
but also for its monetary policy mandate.
17https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/two-tier/html/index.en.html
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Maximizing expected profits for a given deposit rate rD with respect to q
yields the first-order condition
rLL− rDD + rR− κq = 0.
By substituting rD from the participation constraint, we can obtain q̂ as the solution to the
following implicitly defined function:
φ(q, rL, r) ≡ rLL−
u(r)D − rR
q
− κq = 0.






















An application of the implicit function theorem yields the expressions for ∂q̂/∂rL and ∂q̂/∂r.
Proof of Proposition 1. From Equation (7), the first-order condition for the optimal loan rate
31




= q̂(rL, r) (rLL
′(rL) + L(rL))− rL′(rL) +
∂q̂
∂rL











1− u(r)D − rR
u(r)D − rR− q̂2κ
)
= 0.
q̂ and the second bracket are positive, so that the optimal r∗L satisfies condition (8) in the text.












+ 2L′(r∗L) < 0.
which is satisfied since L(·) is a decreasing and concave function. Thus, r∗L maximizes the bank’s
profits.































Equation (A1) implies that the risk channel weakens the portfolio channel whenever ∂q̂/∂r > 0,
which is equivalent to u′(r) < ρ (cf. Lemma 1).
Next, we show the existence of a value r̄ such that for all r < r̄, we must have u(r) < ρ.
Note that by Assumption 2, we must have R = D + E − L(r∗L(r)) > 0 at r = u−1(u), while
u′(u−1(u)) = 0. Moreover if r becomes sufficiently large, R converges to a positive, but finite value,
while u′(r) diverges since u(·) is strictly convex for r > u−1(u). Thus, for sufficiently large r, we
must have u′(r) > ρ, implying that there exists a smallest value r such that u′(r) = ρ. For all
r < r, we have u′(r) < ρ.
Thus, for r < r, we have u′(r) < ρ and, as a consequence of Lemma 1, ∂q̂/∂r > 0. From
18Note that the partial effect of rL on q̂ is irrelevant for determining the sign of the second-order
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Equation (A1) follows immediately, that the risk channel weakens the transmission via the portfolio
channel for r < r.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof follows immediately from Equation (A1)
dr∗L
dr



















u(r)D − rR− q̂2κ
≥ 1 ⇔ (u(r)− u′(r)r)D ≥ κq̂2.
The last inequality cannot be satisfied as long as u′(r)D ≥ R, since u(r)D−rR < κq̂2 (cf. Lemma 1).
Therefore, we restrict attention to u′(r) < ρ. Since u′′(r) > 0, the left-hand side of the above
inequality is strictly decreasing in r, implying that argmaxr{u(r) − u′(r)r} = u−1(u). Thus, as
long as κq̂2 > u, the risk channel can never dominate the portfolio adjustment channel. Hence, a






u(r)D − rR− q̂2κ
(
u(r)D − rR+ κq̂2
)
< 0.
Thus, we can find a value κ such that κq̂(κ)2 = u where κ also satisfies the condition for ∂φ/∂q < 0
in the proof of Lemma 1. Since u(r)− u′(r)r̂)D−κq̂2 is strictly decreasing in r, there exists r̂ such
that for κ ≥ κ
(u(r̂)− u′(r̂)r̂)D − κq̂2 = 0. (A2)
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For r < r̂, we have





Proof Hypothesis 1. We consider an exogenous increase in the deposit volume for a given E and
show that this leads to an increase in excess reserves, a higher reserve-deposit ratio and less lending.
The equilibrium effect of an increased D follows by applying the implicit function theorem to the
two equilibrium conditions
rLL(rL)−
u(r)D − r(D + E − L(rL))
q






Let J∗ denote the Jacobian of the above system of two equations evaluated at the optimum. From
the proofs of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 follows that J∗ < 0 (when the variable vector is (rL, q)).





















Finally, note that the latter implies also a higher reserves-deposit ratio ρ because ρ < 1 and
L′(r∗L)
dr∗L
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−ru′′(r)D − 2κq̂ ∂q̂∂r
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. q̂ is given as the solution to the following implicit function:

















(R− u(r)D)(qδ + (1− δ))
q2














(u(r)D − rR) > 0.









1− (q̂δ + (1− δ))(u(r)D − rR)
(1− δ)(u(r)D − rR)− κq̂2
)
= 0.
Since the second bracket is strictly positive, the optimal loan rate satisfies
rLL
′(rL) + L(rL)−
δq + (1− δ
q
rL′(rL) = 0.
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Thus,
dr∗L







Proof of Hypothesis 3. From the proof of Proposition 4 follows that the reversal rate r̂(δ) is








Using the expressions for ∂q̂/∂r, we can rewrite the latter as
u(r)D − δrR− (1− δ)u′(r)rD − κq̂2 = 0. (A3)
For δ = 0, the above condition is equal to Equation (A2), implying that r̂(δ) converges to the
value of the reversal rate in Proposition 3. Another application of the implicit function theorem
to Equation (A3), taking into account that for r = r̂ we have u′(r) < ρ and ∂R/∂r = 0, implies
∂r̂
∂δ < 0.
Note further that for δ → 1, Equation (A3) cannot be satisfied since q̂ is the larger root, which
implies that κq̂2 − u(r)D + rR > 0. Hence, for δ → 1, the reversal rate ceases to exist.
Proof of Proposition 5. Given a loan market equilibrium, the monitoring effort is implicitly de-
fined by the same condition as before, which we obtain by combining Equation (3) and Equation (4).
In particular, we obtain
∂q̂
∂r






Note that for an interior solution to exist, the profits must be concave in q̂, i.e., u(r)D−rRq̂ −κq̂ < 0.
Equation (12) and Equation (13) simultaneously define the perfectly competitive banking sector
equilibrium.
Substituting Equation (12) into Equation (13) we obtain Equation (14).
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The denominator is positive because in a perfectly competitive equilibrium it must hold that ∂Π∂rL >
0; otherwise, a bank could profitably deviate by decreasing the loan rate. The sign of loan rate
transmission is dictated by E − κq̂(rL, r)∂q̂∂r .
Expanding by rq̂ and using Equation (14), the condition for
d rL





















Because E[x] = 0, we can simplify to the same profit function as in our baseline model




Inserting the participation constraint into the first order condition for q implicitly defines the
function q̂(rL, D, r)
φ(rL, D, r) = rLL(rL) + r R−
u(r)D − (1− q)r
∫ −ρ
−1 (R+ xD) dF (x)
q
− κq = 0.





D + (1− q)
∫ z
−ρ
(R+ xD) dF (x) = R− (1− q)
∫ −ρ
−1






= q((rL − r)L
′


















= qr − u(r) + (1− q)r
∫ z
−ρ
(1 + x) dF (x) = r − u(r)− (1− q)r
∫ −ρ
−1
(1 + x) dF (x) < 0
which is unambiguously negative for r ≤ u(r).
The first-stage profit function, given the required return for the expected equilibrium monitoring
choice becomes
Π(rL, D; r) = q̂(rLL(rL) + r R)− u(r)D − (1− q)r
∫ −ρ
−1




Differentiating with respect to D and rL yields the first-order conditions for a profit maximum.
As the bank optimally minimizes deposit costs, we evaluate the first order condition at D∗ =
(1− σ)L∗(rL) and R∗ = −σL∗(rL), such that ρ = − σ1−σ .




−L′ + (1− q̂)L′
∫ σ
1−σ
−1 dF (x)) +
(
rLL










For r∗L to be the optimal loan rate in equilibrium, it must hold that
∂2Π
∂r2L
< 0. Therefore, drLdr < 0

















Note that limσ → 1, the left hand side approaches zero and the right hand side q̂ such that the
condition can never be fulfilled. If the bank can fund all loan assets paying r for borrowing from
the central bank, no reversal rate can exist.
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